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FAIR TRIAL
FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL IN ENGLISH LAW
DONALD M. GILLMOR*
In England, the rights of free press and fair trial have not been
in open conflict since Parliament and the courts have dearly given
priority to fair trial, and, through the consistent and vigorous use
of the contempt power, have greatly restricted press comment on
judicial proceedings. All procedural and substantive changes proposed
to balance better the values of free press and fair trial fall within the
ambit of contempt of court, as it inheres in the common law or is
defined in Parliamentary enactments. Existing as it does in a unitary
judicial system in which the courts are unable to challenge the con-
stitutionality of legislation, the English law of contempt is, in con-
trast to its American counterpart, exceedingly well settled.
But, except where specific statutory provisions have been made,
contempt of court has not been precisely defined in English law. Exist-
ing definitions suggest a broad and somewhat arbitrary procedure
which can be invoked whenever there is a reasonable tendency that
the administration of justice will be impaired. The following defini-
tion reflects this imprecision:
To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be
constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during the litigation.'
*Coordinator of Honors and Professor of Journalism, University of North
Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota. BA. 1949, Universtiy of Manitoba; MA. 1950,
Ph.D. 1961, University of Minnesota.
This article is based upon a doctoral dissertation, 'Trial by Newspaper': The
Constitutional Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial in English and American
Law (University of Minnesota, 1961).
2 Osvald, Contempt of Court 6 (3d ed. 191o). See Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Law 866 (Gavit ed. 1941): "To this head of summary proceedings may also
be properly referred the method, immemorially used by the superior courts of
justice, of punishing contempts by attachment, and the subsequent proceedings
thereon. The contempts that are thus punished are either direct, which openly
insult or resist the powers of the courts or the persons of the judges who preside
there, or else are consequential, which (without such gross insolence or direct
opposition) plainly tend to create a universal disregard of their authority." And,
Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice § 957 (9 th ed. 1889): "It is a special
contempt, punishable by the committal of the contemner, to misrepresent the pro-
ceedings of the court, to abuse the parties to the cause, or to attempt to prejudice
the mind of the public against them before its cause is decided, or to publish
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Contempt by publication is a criminal offense at common law, pun-
ishable by summary procedure.2 The aggrieved party to a civil or
criminal suit who thinks his right to a fair trial has been imperilled
by published matter can make an affidavit setting out the circum-
stances, and apply by counsel to the court to order a rule nisi for at-
tachment. This implies that the court thinks a prima facie case has been
made that the matter complained of will prejudice a fair trial, and it
orders the attachment (equivalent to committal to prison) of the pub-
lisher, editor, reporter or printer involved unless he comes before the
court on a certain day and "shows cause" why the order should not
be made absolute or final. On the appointed day, the persons against
whom the rule nisi is directed, having sworn affidavits explaining,
excusing or justifying the publication in question, attend and through
their counsel offer the most profuse apologies or show by argument
that no contempt has, in fact, been committed. The court can, in mak-
ing the rule absolute, commit the offenders to prison, leaving them
anything the evident result of which would be to affect the administration of
justice."
2justification for the summary punishment of constructive or out-of-court
contempt is credited to Blackstone, who depended for his opinion upon the
authority of Justice Wilmot's undelivered opinion in R. v. Almon (1765) Wilm.
243 at 254, concerning a libel upon the Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, by a book-
seller. Wilmot believed the procedure to stand upon immemorial usage, to be
coeval with the common law, and to be absolutely necessary to the authority of the
courts. A clerical mistake in drawing up an attachment against Almon led to
abandoning of the case and the 1765 judgment was never delivered, but it was
published posthumously in 18o2. Although these proceedings are not mentioned
in the reports of that period, the case became a widely cited authority for the
summary power to punish constructive contempts of court. Fox, The History of
Contempt of Court 34-37 (1927), doubted the "immemorial" basis of Wilmot's
rule and suggested that before Star Chamber this offense was tried on indictment
and by a jury in the ordinary course of the law. The punishment of libels on
the court by attachment, said Fox, was arbitrary and oppressive Star Chamber
processes adopted in the courts of common law, and they clashed with the whole
system of English law.
3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 392 (1923), says: "Through the medieval
period, and long afterwards, the courts, though they might attach persons who
were guilty of contempts of court, could not punish them summarily. Unless
they confessed their guilt, they must be regularly indicted and convicted"; and
that the assumption by the court of the right to deprive such persons of trial
by jury was borrowed from the Star Chamber.
The last case of constructive contempt tried by jury on indictment was R. v.
Tibbits [19o2] 1 K.B. 77, in which the reporter and the editor of a Bristol news-
paper were convicted of conspiring to prejudice the minds of members of the
community, the magistrate, and the jurors through articles published during
and after a trial. But much earlier in R. v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218 (1821), the
court had adopted the rationale of Justice Wilmot's undelivered opinion in the
Almon case, and the summary punishment of criminal contempts committed out
of court had become the law of the land.
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subsequently to apply for release when they think they can convince
the court that they have purged their contempt; or it can impose a fine;
or both; or simply order the offenders to pay the costs. If the court
is convinced that no contempt has been committed, the rule will be
discharged. 3
The court to which these applications are made is the one before
which the proceeding which it is alleged will be prejudiced is to be
tried, if it is to be tried in a superior court. All superior courts have
the power to punish contempts against themselves. However, it has
been established that the Queen's Bench Division shall deal with
all applications for attachment for contempt in regard to criminal
prosecutions, whether proceeding before the justices in the petty ses-
sions or committed for trial to the assizes or quarter sessions; and with
all applications relating to contempt of inferior courts, such as county
courts, 4 courts martial and consistory courts.5
If a judge has been the victim of an attack in the press, the Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions usually makes the application, although the
court may initiate proceedings on its own motion. When the judge
'Dawson, The Law of the Press 101-02 (1947).
"In R. v. Lefroy [1873] L.R. 8 Q.B. 134, the High Court held that the jurisdic-
tion of the judge of a county court was confined by § 113 (9 & 10 Vict c. 95) to
contempts committed in court; and he had no power to proceed against a person
for a contempt committed out of court. Chief Justice Cockburn said: "In the
case of the Superior Court at Westminster, which represents the one supreme
court of the land, this power was coeval with their original constitution, and has
always been exercised by them. These courts were originally carved out of the
one supreme court, and are all divisions of the aula regis, where it is said the king
in person dispensed justice, and their power of committing for contempt was an
emanation of the royal authority, for any contempt of the court would be a con-
tempt of the sovereign.... No such power has ever been known to be exercised
by an inferior court.... The power is therefore not inherent in the county
courts as courts of record, and it is not given by the statutes, which only makes
them courts of record and gives them limited power over contempt in court."
A similar rule was declared in R. v. Brompton County Court Judge [1893]
2 Q.B. 195 when it was decided that a county court judge has no jurisdiction under
§ 26 of the Solicitors Act of i86o to commit for contempt a person who has acted
as a solicitor in an action in the county court without being qualified. "The
legislature," said the court, "decided ... that it would not entrust such a general
and unlimited power to county court judges."
Justice Wills in R. v. Parke [1903] 2 K.B. 442 said: "Many inferior tribunals
are not Courts of record, and, therefore, have no means of checking practices of
the kind with which we are dealing.... This Court exercises a vigilant watch
over the proceedings of inferior Courts, and successfully prevents them from
usurping powers which they do not possess, or otherwise acting contrary to law."
'In R. v. Editor, etc., of Empire News and Davidson Ex parte The Bishop
of Norwich [1932] All E.R. 516, Lord Hewart stated that "the justification is an
inherent one, and just as this court may correct an inferior court such as the
consistory court, so also in proper circumstances it may protect such a court."
1965]
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himself has been criticized, the practice is for him not to sit at the
hearing.6
In the Queen's Bench Division, but not in the Chancery Division,
all contempt actions are moved by a Law Officer or on the instruc-
tions of the Attorney-General. In recent years it has been suggested
that all contempt proceedings be instituted in this manner to put an
end to contempt actions designed solely to win costs.
7
Before 196o there was no right of appeal against any decision of
punishment for criminal contempt, except on the acquiescence of the
Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions, or in cases
originating in the dominions or colonies.8 Recent legislation allows ap-
peals in all cases of criminal contempt.9
PREJUDICING PENDING PROCEEDINGS
English lawyers do not hold press conferences or issue publicity
releases. Once a person is arrested, newspapers, on pain of a contempt
citation, carefully refrain from publishing pre-trial comment.1 ° And
when a citation has been issued, English judges generally apply a
8Daw v. Eley [1868] L.R. 7 Eq. 49.
'British Section of the International Commission of Jurists (JUSTICE), Con-
tempt of Court 34 (1959); Contempt of'Court, 207 The Law Times 227 (1949).
'In its 1959 Report, Contempt of Court, op. cit. at 35, the British Section of
the International Commission of Jurists (JUSTICE) severely criticized the lack of ap-
peal from contempt convictions under English law and pointed to the fact that
such was the case in no other country in Western Europe. The jurists thought
the right of appeal particularly important in contempt cases, since the law of
contempt is difficult to define; the question often arises as to whether what was
done amounted to a contempt or not; and the conduct complained of should
be weighed against other matters of public concern such as the right of free
speech. Furthermore, in cases where an affront to the judge had been charged, ap-
peals to the Privy Council from the colonies, India, and Ceylon, show that the
right of appeal does rectify wrongs. See, Re Special Reference from the Bahama
Islands [1893] A.C. 138; McLeod v. St. Aubyn [1899] A.C. 549; Re Taylor [1912]
A.C. 347; Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] A.C. 322;
Perara v. The King [1951] A.C. 482; and Izuora v. The Queen [1953] A.C. 327.
In all these cases, in which an appeal was allowed, the contempt conviction was
quashed.
'Administration of Justice Act, ig6o, 8 8 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 13.
20In one of the landmark cases in this area, Re Read and Huggonson (Roach
v. Garvan), 2 Atk. 469 (174)-also referred to as the St. James Evening Post case-
Lord Hardwicke identified three kinds of constructive contempt: (i) scandalizing
the court itself, (2) abuse of parties who are concerned in causes before the Bench,
and (3) prejudicing mankind against a person before the cause is heard. He added:
"It is a contempt of court to prejudice mankind against persons before the case
is heard. There cannot be anything of greater consequence, than to keep the
streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to
themselves and to their characters."
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"reasonable tendency" test in evaluating the effects of offensive publi-
cation. Mr. Justice Kekewich said in 1894:
"The true question was not whether the publication had
interfered with the administration of justice, but whether it
tended so to interfere: and if it tended to prejudice either the
mind of the judge or any other person who would have to con-
sider the case, then it was a publication that ought not to be
allowed.""l
The rule would also seem to be that some degree of bad intent
must be involved. In the leading case-R. v. Payne12-Lord Russell
declared that applications for writs of attachment had become too
frequent, and he added: "Every libel on a person about to be tried
is not necessarily a contempt of Court; but the applicant must show
that something has been published which either is clearly intended, or
at least is calculated, to prejudice a trial which is pending." Three
years later, Lord Justice Cotton, decrying the possible effect of publici-
ty in biasing the minds of jurors, held nevertheless that the court
would not exercise its extraordinary power of committal if the of-
fense complained of was of a "slight or trifling nature," but only if it
was likely to cause substantial prejudice to the parties to the action. 13
The difficulties inherent in a jurisdiction based on a precept as
broad and undefined as "reasonable tendency" are illustrated in an
earlier case in which Mr. Justice Blackburn said in part: "I am greatly
influenced by this, that though here they attempted to influence the
people by what is called appealing to the public, though that in the
present case is utterly ineffectual, yet it may very well occur in future
times that there may be instances in which that would be far from in-
effectual and inoperative."'14 Anxious not to cast doubts upon his own
fortitude or that of his colleagues, Blackburn found it necessary to vin-
dicate the speedy summary power in terms of its deterring future at-
'Re Pall Mall Gazette, Jones v. Flower and Hopkinson [1894] 11 T.L.R. 122.
'[1896] i Q.B. 577. Cf., Powis v. Hunter 2 L.J. Ch. 31 [1832]; Ex parte Greene
and Others in the matter of Robbins of the Press Association [1891] 7 T.L.R. 411;
R. v. Parnell [1886] 14 Cox, C.C. 474. The question of intent was clearly stated
in R. v. Odhams Press, Ltd., Ex parte Attorney-General [1956 ] 3 All E.R. 494. In In
re New Gold Coast Exploration Co. [19oi] 1 Ch. 86o, the Court of Appeals also
thought the contempt power was being applied far too frequently.
'4Hunt v. Clark [1889] 58 LJ.Q.B. 490 (CA.). Cf., Ex parte The Standard,
The Times, January 28, 19o7; R. v. Daily Mail, The Times, January 15, 1907; Re
De Beaujeu's Application for Writ of Attachment against Cudlipp [1949] 1 All E.R.
439.
2R. v. Castro, Skipworth's Case [1873] 9 Q.B. 230. (Emphasis added.) Cf.,
Grimwade v. Cheque Bank [1897] 13 T.L.R. 3o5; R v. Dolan [1907] 2 Ir. R. 260;
R. v. Parker, Ex parte John Bull Ltd., The Times, July 27, 1909.
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tempts to influence other judges. The offending publication could nev-
er have been effectual there but had to be punished to protect future
judges of lesser fibre. Defendant was fined 500 pounds and imprisoned
for three months on these speculative grounds.
That where the question of intent is involved each case will be
decided on its merits is suggested in a 1932 opinion. While a man
was under remand on a charge of murdering his son, News of the
World published, in addition to the formal evidence which had been
given before the magistrates, the following statement: "It was sug-
gested that he met his death in an accidental manner through the
family dog, Prince, knocking over a fully loaded double-barrelled gun
left against the barn door." Since the accused had made a similar state-
ment to police some months before, the court could not consider the
publication an interference with the fair course of justice.3.
The most serious cases of contempt are those committed during
the pendency of criminal or civil trials-though in the latter the court
requires stronger evidence that the matter complained of does actually
tend to prejudice the trial, and juries are less likely to be involved.
When is a case pending?' 6 A leading case on this question is R. v.
R. v. News of the World (Editor, Printer and Publishers), Ex parte Kitchen
[1932] 48 T.L.R. 234. In libel actions in which the newspaper is itself the defen-
dant a problem arises. Will a continued attack by the newspaper interfere with a
fair trial? On the other hand, if the attacks are prohibited by the court as soon
as a writ for libel has been served, the plaintiff has won immunity from further
attacks in spite of the public interest that may be involved in further exposure.
In R. v. Daily Mail (Editor), Ex parte Factor [1928] 44 T.L.R. 303, Jacob Factor
had been exposed by the newspaper for allegedly selling worthless stocks. The
court refused to commit for contempt saying that, "if half of what the Daily
Mail had said were true, it was very much for the public benefit that his unmask-
ing should not be delayed." But the court warned the newspaper not to go on
with the articles if Factor should proceed with his libel action. The court said in
R. v. Blumenfeld, Ex parte Tupper [1912] 28 T.L.R. 3o8, that if it is satisfied that
the publication intends to justify what it has said about the plaintiff in a subse.
quent libel hearing, it will not restrain the publication before the action has
begun.
:'Earlier cases do not serve to clarify the question of pendency. In Metzler v.
Gounod [1874J 3o L.T. 264, a plaintiff obtained a verdict, leave being reserved to
the defendant to move for a new trial. But the court would not consider the
action to be still pending so as to allow an attachment for contempt against an
agent for the defendant who distributed printed comments on the trial, even
though those comments misrepresented the evidence which had been given. Cf.,
R. v. Editor and Publishers of the Evening News, Ex parte Hobbs, The Times,
April 7, 1925, P. 5-
Compare, Dallas v. Ledger, Re Ledger [1888] 52 J.P. 828, where a trial jury
found a verdict against a defendant in a libel action, and the defendant gave
notice of motion for a new trial, and meanwhile presented an article in his news-
FAIR TRIAL
Davies, Ex parte Delbert Evans.17 A medical practitioner was con-
victed in the Central Criminal Court on charges of procuring abor-
tions and was sentenced to five years penal servitude. Before an appeal
was heard-although it was not clear to the court whether a notice of
appeal had been formally filed or not-News of the World published
an article stating that the police had been investigating the doctor's
case for twenty years, and that he had made and concealed a fortune.
Although the court decided that the article in question did not tend
to interfere with the administration of justice and was therefore not
a contempt of court, it laid down the rule that after a man has been
convicted of a criminal offense, and before his appeal has been heard
or the time for appeal has expired, the publication of comments 18 on
the case may constitute a contempt of court. Justice Humphreys noted
that the Court of Criminal Appeals, because it may conduct retrials
of indictments and make use of a jury, deals with more than ques-
tions of law "Therefore, any matter which is published between
the date of the conviction and the date of the hearing by the Court of
Criminal Appeals may be a matter which may come to the attention of
a person who has to try the guilt or innocence of that indictment of
that person or individual."
In a more recent case, Lord Parker, the present Chief Justice of
England, declared that although a case might be considered sub judice
until all possibilities of appeal had been exhausted, the significant
paper commenting adversely upon the conduct of the jury, it was held that such
comment did not amount to a contempt of court.
Contra, Re Labouchere, Ex parte Columbus Co., Ltd., [1901] 17 T.L.R. 578,
in which the proprietors of Truth commented on the reliability of a witness in
a civil suit after the jury had disagreed but before a motion for a new trial had
been filed; they were fined 5o pounds and costs for contempt. In delivering the
opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Bruce said that the only question was whether
the publication of the article tended to interfere with the due administration of
justice. The jurisdiction of the court, he said, existed not only to prevent the mis-
chief in that particular case, but also to prevent similar mischief arising in other
cases-a preventive purpose antithetical to the American doctrine of clear and
present danger. Cf., R. v. Freeman's Journal [igo2] 2 Ir. R. 82, in which the court
held that where a prosecution for seditious libel had taken place but the jury
had disagreed, and it was intended (though not formally stated) that a new jury
would be empanelled, the proceeding was still pending and it was a contempt of
court to criticize the action in a newspaper.
1[1945] 2 All E.R. 167 (D.C.).
nEnglish editors must take pains to distinguish between news reporting and
commentary. All preliminary and interlocutory proceedings, if publicly heard,
can be fully reported, but comment must be reserved until after the trial has taken
place and final judgment delivered. Usually, an inaccurate or misleading account
of a trial is not contempt, if the mistake is not purposeful, Birch v. Walsh io Ir.
Eq. R. 93 (1846).
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consideration was "whether the article when published ... was in
all the circumstances calculated really to interfere with the hearing
of an appeal, should one be brought."' 9 The case, then, rested more on
its particular facts than on any binding legal rule; and in this instance
the trial had concluded and an appeal had been lodged when there
appeared a rather vitriolic article asserting the guilt of the accused
and condemning him as a man of violence. The article was ineffectual,
said the Lord Chief Justice, and:
"Even if a judge who eventually sat on the appeal had seen the
article in question and had remembered its contents, it is in-
conceivable that he would be influenced consciously or uncon-
sciously by it. A judge is in a very different position to a Jiry-
man. Though in no sense superhuman, he has by his training
no difficulty in putting out of his mind matters which are not
evidence in the case....
Nevertheless, Lord Parker concluded, newspapers continue to publish
such articles at their peril. It would therefore seem wise for newspaper
editors to reserve comments on a trial until after the issue has been
dealt with by the appellate court, especially in light of the fact that
an appeal may result in an order for a new trial before a jury. Al-
though the courts have not spoken clearly on the matter, an appeal
is generally not pending until formal written notice of appeal has
been served. 21 Where the issue has been settled beyond the possibility
of an appeal, judicial proceedings are over and a contempt citation is
no longer possible.
22
'"R. v. Duffy [196o] 2 Q.B. 188 at 197-98.
'Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Contra, R. v. Davies, Ex parte Delbert Evans, supra, in
which Justices Humphreys and Oliver suggested that judges are not immune to the
effects of outside information. This issue is argued in American terms in Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); and
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 368 (1947).
"In R. v. Daily Mail, Ex parte Farnsworth [1921] 2 K.B. 733, a reporter used
information as to the sentence before it was confirmed and the court fined his edi-
tor for contempt.
2In Dunn v. Bevan, Bodie v. Bevan [1922] 1 Ch. 276, certain members of a trade
union brought an action against the officials of the union. After the action was heard
and judgment given, the plaintiffs issued and distributed among the member-
ship a circular containing what the defendants alleged to be unfair statements
regarding the proceedings. A motion was brought for an injunction to restrain
the plaintiffs from so injuring the defendants, but was dismissed with costs. The
court relied on Oswald, supra note i, at 97: "Proceedings are pending immediately
the writ is issued, and as long as any proceedings can be taken. But when the
cause is dead or has been ended, comments may be made; and the fact that a
new trial has been moved for makes no difference." The general rule was stated
earlier in Re De Souza, The Times, December 3, 1888.
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Sometimes a trial judge does not give his judgment immediately
after the jury returns its verdict; in a criminal case sentence is occa-
sionally postponed, and in a civil action the judge often desires to hear
legal arguments on the effect of the jury's findings. When this oc-
curs, comment should be reserved until the judge has dealt with the
matter, although, since the jury has discharged its duties and a judge
is presumed to be less susceptible to the influence of publicity, the ef-
fect of such comment will be much less serious than if made at an
earlier stage23 In cases where the jury disagrees, it may be assumed that
a new trial will be held.
The most severe punishment ever imposed upon an English news-
paper came in the 1949 case of R. v. Bolam, Ex parte Haigh,24 at the
termination of which an editor of less than a month, Sylvester Bolam,
was sentenced to Brixton Prison for three months, and the publishers
of the London Daily Mirror were fined io,ooo pounds. The case arose
when one Haigh was charged with the acid bath murders of wealthy
acquaintances. The offending stories included front page references
to a "Vampire" and its habit of drinking pulsing blood from live
victims. On an inside page was printed a picture of John George
Haigh, 39, who had been charged the day before with the murder of
an elderly woman. A day later, the Mirror headlined a page one story:
"The Vampire Man Held," and on page two appeared a feature story
with a drawing of a vampire bat. There was no direct reference to
Haigh, but a dapper man was described as the killer, and the descrip-
tion could appear to fit Haigh-quite enough evidence under English
law.25 Haigh's arrest had been preceded by a wave of sensational stories
in even the conservative British newspapers, most of which had de-
scribed how such a monster might prey on wealthy people and then
chemically destroy their bodies.
The conduct of the Mirror, said the court, was a disgrace to English
journalism and violated every principle of justice and fair play which
it had been the pride of that country to extend to the worst of crimi-
nals. And it appeared that the newspaper had ignored a warning from
the Commissioner of Police not to embark upon a recounting of the
details of the case. Speaking for the court, Lord Chief Justice God-
dard declared:
2Dawson, supra note 3, at 96.
2[r949] 93 Sol. J. 22o (D.C.).
- London Paper is Fined $4o,ooo; Editor Jailed for 'Vampire' Stories, E & P,
April 2, 1949.
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"In the long history of the present class of cases there had
never, in the opinion of the Court, been one of such a scandal-
ous and wicked character. It was of the utmost importance that
the Court should vindicate the common principles of justice
and, in the public interest, see that condign punishment was
meted out to persons guilty of such conduct. In the opinion
of the Court what had been done was not the result of an error
of judgment but was done as a matter of policy in pander-
ing to sensationalism for the purpose of increasing the circu-
lation of the newspaper."
And as an ominous warning:
"If for the purpose of increasing the circulation of their
paper they should again venture to publish such matter as this,
the directors themselves might find that the arm of that Court
was long enough to reach them and deal with them individual-
ly. The Court had taken the view that there must be severe
punishment."26
And The Times closed a denunciatory editorial with this cau-
tion: "This melancholy episode is a reminder of high responsibilities
which are not invariably discharged with even fidelity." 27
In a 1956 case, crime reporters had gathered damaging informa-
tion on one Micallef who was allegedly engaged in the business of
purveying vice and managing prostitutes. The headline over an article
in a widely circulated daily exclaimed, "Arrest This Beast." What
those responsible for the article did not know was that the man whom
they had so diligently tracked had been arrested three weeks earlier
and had already been committed for trial. On motions for writs of
attachment against the proprietors of the newspaper, its editor, and
the reporter responsible for the article, the Attorney-General accepted
the plea that none of the respondents knew that criminal proceeding
against Micallef were underway. But the Divisional Court of the
Queen's Bench Division, Lord Chief Justice Goddard presiding, held
that whether or not those responsible knew of the arrest was immater-
ial to the question whether a contempt had been committed, since
the plea of mens rea-a guilty mind-was not a necessary element of
contempt. The test of guilt, said the Court, was whether the matter
complained of was calculated to interfere with the course of justice,
not whether that result was intended. The truth or falsity of the re-
ports was not at issue. The court noted that the offending article gave
in a sensational manner details of the accused's relationships with per-
4R. v. Bolam, supra note 24, at 220.
21E 8 P, supra note 25.
FAIR TRIAL
sons of bad character and previous convictions, the number of which
were exaggerated tenfold. Publishers, editor and reporter were assessed
heavy fines.
28
The decision did not set well with English journalists or with some
segments of the legal profession. Brian Inglis, writing in The Spectator
noted that defense attorneys had cited 1889 and 19o6 precedents in
which the judge had decided that knowledge is an essential element
of contempt. But in its opinion the High Court dismissed these, basing
its decision instead on i8o6 and 1742 cases in which the judges had de-
cided that knowledge was not an essential ingredient of contempt.
Inglis suggested that precedents before the 182o's, at the earliest, be
handled gingerly, since the press was not then in any sense a fourth es-
tate, and judges largely took their orders from the Government.29
The British Section of the International Commission of Jurists
took a similar view, stating: "We consider that in general it should be
a defense to any charge of contempt in relation to matter alleged
to prejudice any judicial proceeding that the alleged contemner
neither knew nor had any reason to know or suspect that such proceed-
ing had begun."30 Recent legislation has incorporated this recommen-
dation.31
Not unrelated to the foregoing case was the 1957 case of R. v. Grif-
fith32 in which the importers and distributors of Newsweek magazine,
which contained an article prejudicial to Dr. John Bodkin Adams, were
convicted of contempt. Neither lack of knowledge of the contents of
the offending article nor lack of intent was acceptable as a defense.
2'R. v. Odhams Press, Ltd., Ex parte Attorney-General [1956] 3 All E.R. 494.
The court relied in part on an opinion by Lord Chancellor Erskine in Ex parte
Jones, 13 Ves. 237 (1806) in which he said that it is no excuse that the printer
was ignorant of the contents, lack of intention or knowledge being no excuse,
although it may have a bearing on punishment. "The test is whether the matter
complained of is calculated to interfere with the course of justice."
=Inglis "Contempt of Court," The Spectator, January 17, 1958, pp. 68-69.
mJUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 9.
3nAdministration of Justice Act, ig6o, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § ii(i): "A person
shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has published any
matter calculated to interfere with the course of justice in connection with any
proceeding pending or imminent at the time of publication if at that time (having
taken all reasonable care) he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the
proceedings were pending, or that such proceedings were imminent, as the case
may be."
"2[1957] 2 All E.R. 379. The distributors had relied upon the defense of innocent
defamation based on Emmens v. Pottle (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 654. But, "cases of con-
tempt," said the court, "by the publication of matters tending to prejudice a
fair trial stand in a class of their own and are not truly analogous to cases of
defamation."
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Again, liberal elements in the legal profession viewed the decision
as imposing a real hardship on distributors of news, and an obstacle,
contrary to the public interest, to the importation of news and views
from abroad. Recognizing, nevertheless, that accused persons should
not be put in jeopardy by publications for which those responsible
cannot be reached, the British Section of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists recommended that, in general, it be a defense to such
a charge against a distributor to prove that "he had not examined
the contents of" any publication distributed by him "and had no
reasonable cause to suspect that" it contained matter in contempt
of court.33 Again Parliament obliged and relieved distributors of
this onerous burden-at least to a degree.
3 4
Speech as well as the printed word may lead to a contempt cita-
tion.35 Where a newspaper published a supposed confession while the
suspect was in custody under a warrant but had not been brought
before a magistrate, the court levied a heavy fine: "Even if a confes-
sion had really been made," said Mr. Justice Darling, "it might still
have been contempt to publish it; it might have been of such kind as
to be inadmissible in evidence."3 6 And he added that English courts
were determined not to substitute "trial by newspaper" for trial by
jury.
A newspaper was held in contempt for publishing articles describ-
ing as a "crank" and a person regarded by the police as a "harmless lun-
atic nursing a grievance" one Hutchison, then under arrest for the
unlawful possession of firearms.37 Mr. Justice Swift stressed that it
was essential that when a criminal charge was made against a person,
3'JUSTCE, op. cit. Supra note 7, at io.
a Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 11(2): "A person
shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has distributed
a publication containing such matter as is mentioned in subsection (1) of this sec-
tion if at the time of distribution (having taken all reasonable care) he did not
know that it contained any such matter as aforesaid and had no reason to sus-
pect that it was likely to do so."
35R. v. Gossip, The Times, February 18, 19og. A trade union secretary was
held in contempt and ordered to pay costs for a speech "calculated to diminish
the chance of a fair trial by discouraging tihe attendance of necessary witnesses
and possibly by influencing a jury which might be drawn from that part of
London." In referring to an action pending between two tailors and their em-
ployers' Gossip cautioned his trade union audience not to lose sight of the fact
that "judges are drawn from the capitalist class." The rule was made absolute
in spite of a sincere and humble apology and the contention by the defendant
that he did not know the action was pending.
36R. v. Clarke, Ex parte Crippen [191o] io3 L.T. 636.
-R. v. Editor, Printers and Publishers of the Evening News, The Times, July
30, 1936, p. 4, col. 3 (K.B.).
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there should be no tampering of any sort or kind with those who would
ultimately have to decide the matter.38
The editor of the Daily Worker was convicted of contempt for
alleging that the forthcoming trial of a defendant was a "frameup"
and that he was a class-war prisoner.3 9 A newspaper may be held in
contempt for publishing beforehand what is said to be the defense of
the accused.40 A prejudicial cartoon may constitute a contempt of
court.41 A newspaper may be guilty of contempt for publishing a
photograph of an accused person, if identification becomes an issue in
the case, and if there is any possibility of the photo influencing the
minds of witnesses.
42
-For comment upon a pending criminal case, the author of the following
paragraph was fined ioo pounds and costs: "Another rare rogue in the shape of
Jabez Balfour was a good deal before the courts last month. He will appear at the
Old Bailey, and then we may expect to hear no more of him for some time to
come. Nemesis has leaden feet, but even justice comes to him who knows how
to wait. Unfortunately the waiters sometimes die before they come to their own."
Speaking of the contemner, Mr. Justice Wills said: "He assumed that the man
was such a rogue that it did not matter what was said against him. The English
Press in this respect has been singularly deficient in decency, taking it for granted
that Mr. Balfour would be convicted.... The writer here had thrown his con-
tribution into the stream of prejudice against the person to be tried, and was
anticipating the result of the trial...." R. v. Balfour, Re Stead [1895] 11 T.L.R.
493-
In R. v. Parke [i9o3] 2 K.B. 432, a newspaper editor was fined 50 pounds for
the publication of derogatory comments about the character of a defendant in
a forgery case-who was subsequently convicted of murder. In the course of his
opinion, Justice Wills suggested that proceeding by criminal information or indict-
ment in such cases was cumbrous and would give rise to great delay. A similar
conclusion was reached in R. v. Davies [19o6] i K.B. 32, where a woman charged
with abandoning an infant child, but not yet committed for trial for attempted
murder of the child, was referred to in a newspaper article as having practiced
wholesale baby farming and as having been convicted of fraud. Relying on his
opinion in the Parke case, Mr. Justice Wills said: "We adhere to the view we
expressed in that case that the publication of such articles is a contempt of the
Court which ultimately tries the case after committal, although at the time when
they are published it cannot be known whether there will be a committal or
not. Their tendency is to poison the stream of justice in that Court, though at the
time of their publication the stream had not reached it ... "
3R. v. Mason, The Times, December 7, 1932, p. 4, (K.B.).
'OR. v. News of the World; Ex parte Kitchin [1932] 48 T.L.R. 234.
1-R. v. Editor of the Evening News, The Times, October 27, 1925.
'PEdgar William Smith had been charged with the attempted murder of a
policeman. On the day he was to stand in the police line-up for identification,
the Daily Mirror and the Daily Mail published photographs of him, and referred
to him as the man accused of shooting the policeman. The only witness to identify
him had a copy of the Daily Mail in his pocket. In his opinion for the court, Lord
Chief Justice Hewart noted that: "The phrase 'contempt of Court,'... consists
not in some attitude or supposed attitude to the Court itself, but the prejudice
to an accused person. It is not something which affects the status of the Court,
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The Daily Herald was convicted of contempt for publishing a pos-
ter containing the words "Another Blazing Car Murder" which,
although relating to another case, came at a time when an accused
stood committed for trial on the charge of murdering a man in a car
and then burning the vehicle.
43
During a royal procession in London, a revolver fell close to His
Majesty's horse. It appeared that it was either thrown by or knocked
out of the hand of a man who was subsequently charged with being
in unlawful possession of firearms. A news film-part of a theatre
news reel-shown with the caption, "Attempt on the King's Life," was
held to be in contempt of court in that it was liable to prejudice the
accused's fair trial. The court would make no distinction between
newspapers and news film.
44
English courts have been particularly sensitive to newspapers
which employ amateur detectives or their own reporters to investigate
the facts of a crime and publish their results. This "perilous enter-
prise" is considered by the courts to be the very worst form of "trial
by newspaper." In the first notable case of this kind, the Evening
Standard hired detectives to investigate the murder and dismember-
ment of young girl in Eastbourne. The results were published in
a series of articles and photographs which included an account of the
married life of the accused. The newspaper also interviewed a pros-
pective witness who had been warned by police not to make a state-
ment. In citing the editor for contempt, the court noted that it would
not have been possible even for the most ingenious mind to have an-
ticipated with certainty what were to be the real issues in the case, to
say nothing of the more difficult question of what was to be the rela-
tive importance of different issues in the trial which was about to take
place.
45
but something which may profoundly affect the rights of citizens." Lord Hewart
felt that the newspapers should have anticipated the question of identity arising.
(R. v. Daily Mirror, Ex parte Smith [19271 1 K.B. 845). The court relied on R. v.
Haslam [19251 19 Cr. App. R. 6o: "It cannot be right that when a witness, or a pos-
sible witness, is being called on merely to identify a person who is already ar-
rested, that the witness, before the identification, should be shown a photograph
of the accused person .... A person who has seen a photograph of the accused
person may identify him simply because he has seen a photograph of him .... If a
newspaper publishes a photograph in such circumstances it runs a grave risk-a
risk which in one sense affects the accused person, and in another sense affects
those responsible for the newspaper."
43R. v. Editor, Printers and Publishers of the Daily Herald [1931] 75 Sol. J.
119 (K.B.).
"R. v. Hutchison, Ex parte McMahon [1936] 2 All E.R. 1514.
4
1R. v. Evening Standard (Editor), Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions,
R. v. Manchester Guardian (Editor), Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions,
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Civil actions are no less protected by the contempt power of the
courts. In a case involving a bankrupt shipping firm, two Liverpool
newspapers were judged guilty of contempt for quoting the managing
director of the company as saying that the plaintiff's action had
"smashed up in a day" the goodwill of the business and its immense
organization on the continent. The court held that to publish in-
jurious misrepresentations directed against a party to an action is
liable to affect the course of justice, because it may, in the case of
a plaintiff, cause him to discontinue the action from fear of public
dislike, or it may cause the defendant to come to a compromise to
which he would otherwise not come.4 6 The Daily Worker was held in
contempt for threatening a litigant who was pursuing an action in
court and for the adverse effect the published statement would have on
the ability of the plaintiff to gather witnesses on his behalf.47 It is a
contempt of court to publish in a newspaper, after the affidavits in a
cause have been filed, but before the hearing, an article attributing
falsehood to the persons who have made the affidavits. 48 It is a con-
tempt also to publish prematurely the results of an interview of a de-
faulter by a company in liquidation.4 9 It is dangerous for newspaper
R. v. Daily Express (Editor), Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions [1924] 40
T.L.R. 833, 835. Chief Justice Hewart sternly rejected the idea that it was the duty
of newspapers to elucidate the facts in criminal cases. The Evening Standard was
fined ooo pounds. The Daily Express and the Manchester Guardian, which had
also printed the story-the Guardian because the victim was a Manchester girl-
each paid 300 pounds and costs. During the 50-year editorship of C. P. Scott of
the Guardian, this was the only contempt of court citation brought against his
newspaper. Cf., R. v. Tibbits and Windust [19o2] i K.B. 77, where an editor and
his "special crime investigator" were sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment for
attempting to interfere with the course of justice through the publication of
prejudicial matter which was inadmissible as evidence.
'0Re William Thomas Shipping Co., Ltd., Dillon (H.W.) & Sons, Ltd. v.
William Thomas Shipping Co., Ltd., Re Sir Robert Thomas [193o] 2 Ch. 368.
The court relied on Oswald, op. cit. supra note i, at 87: "Any conduct by which
the course of justice is perverted, either by a party or a stranger, is a contempt;
thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending,
even if the threatening letter is marked 'Private'; or abusing a party in letters to
persons likely to be witnesses in the cause, have been held to be contempts." And id.
at 91: "All publications which offend against the dignity of the Court, or are calcu-
lated to prejudice the course of justice will constitute contempts ... anything which
tends to excite prejudice against the parties in litigation while it is pending."
47H-lutchinson v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, The Times, August 25,
1932, P. 4 (K.B.).
9Felkin v. Herbert [1864] 33 L.J. Ch. 294. In order to purge his contempt,
said the court, a publisher must express his regret and contrition to the court, but
is not obliged to apologize to the person to whom the falsehood has been imputed.
",Re American Exchange in Europe, American Exchange in Europe v. Gillig
[t889] 58 L.J. Ch. 7o6.
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editors to publish statements from affidavits sworn in an interlocutory
proceeding in a civil action before the trial.50
English courts have always considered contempt committed by a
party to a pending proceeding as more serious than that committed
by a third party: editors therefore must use extreme caution in per-
mitting reference in their papers to libel actions which have been
instituted against themselves or their employers.51
English judges have had as much difficulty as American judges in
deciding what may or may not constitute prejudice. In 1943, the
Court of Criminal Appeal quashed a conviction for larceny where a
list of prior convictions had been read before the magistrates to en-
able them to decide how to deal with the case, and a local newspaper,
in its report of the preliminary proceedings, had published the list.52
On the other hand, in 1951, where a person had been sentenced at
Surrey Quarter Sessions to four years' corrective training for larceny
and his previous convictions had been mentioned before trial in
the Surrey newspapers, the same court declined to infer either that
5In R. v. Astor, Ex parte Isaacs, R. v. Madge, Ex parte Isaacs [1913] 3o T.L.R.
io, the Pall Mall Gazette and the Globe were assessed court costs for publishing
two items of news, the first relating to private proceedings in a pending action
in connection with a share transaction, and the second giving a report of criminal
proceedings (not yet finished) relating to the same transaction. The court held
that the publication tended to prejudice the jury trying the criminal case and
that a newspaper ought not, before a case comes on for trial, to publish in full
the private proceedings, such as the statement of claim or an affidavit charging
fraud. M~fr. Justice Scrutton said that if a paper took upon itself to mix up together
the reports of criminal proceedings and of civil proceedings relating to the same
share transaction, he could come to no other conclusion than that it might tend
to prejudice the jury trying the case, who were not trained lawyers able to dis-
tinguish the exact relevance of a charge of that kind. Cf., Re Finance Union,
Yorkshire Provident Assurance Co. v. Review Publishers [1895] 11 T.L.R. 167,
where a publication tended to show that the plaintiff's case in a civil action was
untenable; Re O'Connor, Chesshire v. Strauss [1896] 12 T.L.R. 291, where it was
held to be contempt to publish a copy of the statement of claim in a pending
action.
aDawson, supra note 3, at 94. Cf., R. v. Bottomley, Ex parte Attorney-General,
The Times, December 16, January 19, 19o9; R. v. J. G. Hammqnd 8- Co., [1914]
3o T.L.R. 491. In Birmingham Vinegar Brewery v. Henry [1894] 10 T.L.R. 586, a
newspaper published an article relating to proceedings against its editor for libel,
attacking certain witnesses whom it was known would be called at the trial by the
plaintiff. Mr. Justice Wills said that there was a great and mischievous tendency
to publish articles of that sort "and if it went on it would lead to trial by news-
paper instead of by the proper tribunals." In Higgins v. Richards [1912] 28 T.L.R.
202, a contempt by a defendant-editor in a libel action was regarded as so serious
that he was imprisoned for six weeks. It was pleaded on the editor's behalf that
the attacks on the plaintiff, a local police chief, had no reference to the subject
matter of the libels sued on in the action, but the court thought otherwise.
Wr. v. Dyson [1943] 169 L.T. 237.
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the jury had read the report, or, if they had, that they were biased.
53
At the end of a long trial, during the Autumn 1957 assizes at New-
castle upon Tyne, of two men who had escaped from prison a year
before, and were found guilty of conspiracy to defraud, Justice Barry
observed that on the first day of the trial, a local newspaper had issued
a statement "which would seem at least to constitute a very serious
contempt of court." Hesitant to use the procedural remedies, such as
change of venue, continuance or mistrial, which American judges
are using with greater and greater frequency, Justice Barry concluded
that in other circumstances publication might have given rise to dis-
charge of the jury and the retrial elsewhere with the attendant ex-
pense of a long case.5 4 However, on November 6, 1957, at Exeter City
Assizes, Mr. Justice Salmon stopped the trial of John Henry Walter
Oliver who had pleaded not guilty to a charge of murdering his wife.
On the first day of the trial, three newspapers and the Press Association,
which carried the story, published reports which the court believed
might have been grossly prejudicial to a fair trial. Humble apologies
were tendered and the media admitted the inaccuracy of the report
which an otherwise reliable reporter had obtained from two of his
colleagues.5 5 In the news story, what purported to be a part of the
opening speech of the Crown counsel was actually part of the speech
made by counsel at the preliminary hearing in Magistrate's court.56
Justice Salmon deplored the fact that two witnesses would have to
'3R. v. Armstrong (1951) 2 All E.R. 2i9.
'This case was reported in The Times, October 18, 1957 and cited in Webber,
Trial by Newspaper, in Keeton and Schwarzenberger, eds., ii Current Legal Prob-
lems 39 (1958)-
-Inaccuracy can be expensive in English journalism. In R. v. Evening Standard
Co., Ltd. [19543 1 Q.B. 578, the Evening Standard was fined i,ooo pounds and costs
for a contemptuous article under the headline, "Trunk Trial Story of Marriage
Offer-Husband is Accused." During the course of the trial, in which the accused
was charged with the murder of his wife whose body had been found in a trunk,
the reporter left the courtroom to telephone his newspaper and missed a crucial
point of evidence. The result was an inaccurate story which the court said
might have interfered with the course of justice. Since neither the reporter nor the
editor appeared to have intentionally misrepresented the proceedings of the court,
no separate penalties was imposed upon them. The accused was subsequently
acquitted. Lord Chief Justice Goddard said that the summary jurisdiction of the
court should only be invoked and would only be exercised "in cases of real and
serious moment;" a motion to attach was deprecated where there had not really been
"a serious interference with justice." But here there might have been a "disastrous
interference with justice." Id. at 584. The court rejected the view that the editor
and proprietor could not be vicariously liable, relying instead on earlier principles
laid down by Lord Hardwicke, Lord Russell of Killowen, and Justice Wills.
uThe Times, November 6, 1957, p. 6; November 7, 1957, p- 7-
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undergo the harrowing experience of giving their evidence all over
again, and much public time and money would be wasted.
PRELIMINARY HEARINGS AND IN CAMERA PROCEEDINGS
There has been a good deal of discussion in England as to whether
preliminary proceedings should be held in camera to protect the de-
fendant from prejudiced jurymen. Proceedings in a police court or
petty sessions preliminary to a committal for trial deal only with the
evidence of the prosecution, not all of which may be admissible at the
trial itself. In 1865, Chief Justice Lefroy ruled that a fair and accurate
report of such proceedings does not constitute a contempt of court for
"it is of the utmost importance for the public to know that the magis-
trates do their duty impartially and without influence of any sort, and
that they exercise their duty fairly and correctly according to the evi-
dence brought before them-not only to prevent them from making
unfair orders against the prisoners, but also to prevent them from
undue influence which might be ascribed to them as officers appointed
by the Crown." 57 Similarly, in a 1925 case, it was decided that a fair
and accurate report of a Recorder's charge to the grand jury was
privileged so as to render the publishers immune from contempt pro-
ceedings.5 8
Long-standing doubts as to the wisdom of these judgments came
into sharp focus during the sensational murder trial of Dr. Adams in
1957. Details concerning the deaths of a number of his patients, pre-
sented at the preliminary hearing to illustrate a system of criminal
action, were vividly reported in the press, although at the trial itself,
the prosecution restricted itself to one act of alleged murder. Adams'
counsel had asked that such evidence be given in a closed hearing,
but the request was refused.
In summing up at the Old Bailey, Lord Devlin urged that pro-
ceedings in the magistrate's court in such cases be held in private in
the future, since it seemed impossible that an unprejudiced jury could
be assembled after such a "disgraceful" and "scandalous" performance
by the press. Lord Devlin regarded it as a matter of major impor-
tance that a case could be built up against a man in such a form as to
prejudice his chances of acquittal, even before a charge had been made.
While we were still some way from lynch law, he believed the con-
duct of the press in the Adams case perilously close to "trial by news-
1R7R. v. Gray [1865] 10 Cox C.C. 184 (Q.B.).
1,R. v. Editor and Publisher of the Evening News, Ex parte Hobbs [1925] 2
K.B. 158.
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paper."' 9 To counteract these potential evils, the English jurist ad-
vocated that magistrates have the power, while sitting in open court,
to prohibit the press from publishing reports in whole or in part of
proceedings before them. 60
OConduct of the Prosecution in the Adams Case, The Times, May 2, 1957, p. 4-
"Devlin found legal precedent in R. v. Clement, 4 B. & AId. 218 (1821): Sev-
eral persons being successively on trial for treason (the Cato Street conspiracy) on
similar evidence, the court issued an order that no report of the trials should
be published until all of them had been concluded. Ignoring the order, a news-
paper editor was held in contempt. But criminal trials in England must be public
and except in a few statutory cases, the judge has no power to forbid the publi-
cation of evidence given publicly. See Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of
Court in English Law, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 9o4 (935).
English law is not uncomplicated in this area. A controlling case until the
middle of the 19th century was R. v. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563 (811), in which Lord
Ellenborough declared: "But these preliminary examinations have no such priv-
ilege. Their only tendency is to prejudge those whom the law still presumes in-
nocent, and to poison the sources of justice." The Law of Libel Amendment Act
of 1888 clearly gave the press the privilege of reporting preliminary hearings, sub-
ject to the contempt power. Section 4(2) of the Magistrate's Court Act of 1952 (15 &
16 Geo. 6 and 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55) essentially affirmed the provision of an 1884 act
(Jervis's Acts, ii & 12 Vict., p. 54, Archbold ed. 2d ed. 1849) specifying that
magistrates were not obliged to sit in open court, though hearings, somewhat para-
doxically, routinely continued to be held in public, with the exception of cases
involving the national interest, cases in which there was fear of witness intimi-
dation, or cases involving hospital patients or individuals similarly incapacitated.
Until the Adams case there had been few protests against this procedure. See Geis,
Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 400-01 (igoi).
The Press Council gave the following reasons for its opposition to such a sug-
gestion: (i) the injustice of gossip and rumor would be a poor substitute for pub-
licity, (2) witnesses are sometimes prompted to come forward-and not necessarily
for the defense-with valuable evidence, and the accused learns at least in outline
the charges he has to face, (3) if the general public is admitted to preliminary
hearings but press reports are prohibited, inadequate and misleading re-
porting by word of mouth will take their place, (4) faith in trial by jury rests
upon the proved ability of juries to respond to the directions of the judge and come
to their verdict on the evidence they have heard, and that evidence alone, disre-
garding what they have heard or read elsewhere, (5) it is important that the work
of Justices of the Peace be done within the full knowledge of the public, and, (6)
magistrates should have no more power than they possess already to hear in private
evidence relating to indictable offenses. See Court Secrecy Opposed, The Times,
May 2, 1957, p. 7.
These objections were disputed by Gower, Publicity in Judicial Proceedings,
20 Modern L. Rev. 388 passim (1957). Gossip and rumor, he said, based on the
one-sided account of the prosecution, would be given much wider distribution
and stimulation by the press. There are better ways of gathering witnesses than
by advertising for them in the press. The grapevine, said Gower, does not travel
as far as a press report, and unless such a report is verbatim, it may be no less
inadequate and therefore misleading. The alleged "proved ability" of jurors to
reach verdicts dispassionately has been pretty conclusively disproved. Investiga-
tion of the behavior of juries has shown that the one way of ensuring that a piece
of evidence is indelibly imprinted on their minds is for the judge to direct them
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As a result of Devlin's remarks on the Adams trial, the Home Sec-
retary in June, 1957 appointed the Tucker Committee to review the
question of preliminary hearings. Press reaction was immediate, con-
demning strongly anything suggestive of secret court hearings and
questioning whether justices were qualified to decide whether or not
hearings should be open to the public.61 The Institute of Journalists,
pointing to the time lag between committal and trial, recommended
that there be no general ban on press reporting but that magistrates
have the power to direct that certain parts of the testimony not be
published. 2 At that same time, the Howard League for Penal Reform
thought that committal proceedings should receive no publicity ex-
cept at the request of the defense counsel or where no case had been
found.
63
The Tucker Committee viewed preliminary hearings as primarily
for the benefit of the accused in safeguarding him against the incon-
venience of a trial based on frivolous or malicious prosecution. But
the committee did not favor a more extensive use of in camera pro-
ceedings, though it did recommend -that the newspapers be restricted
to publishing only the bare essentials of the charge and the com-
mittal court's decision, the full account waiting until the trial had been
concluded. Nevertheless, more lawyers are asking for and more courts
are granting closed preliminary hearings.
The matter is far from settled. Lord Denning suggests that "the
importance of having all judicial proceedings in public outweighs...
all the suggested disadvantages," for the press is "the watchdog of
justice." 64 And Justice Fitzgerald said in R. v. Gray:
"It has been said, and said truly, that possibly in particular
cases there may be inconvenience to individuals from the early
publication of evidence or of statements with respect to matters
that are subsequently to be tried more solemnly; but it has been
well observed, too, that this inconvenience to individuals is in-
finitesimal in comparison to the great public advantage given
by that publicity." 65
In the leading case on the question, the House of Lords made it
clear that, apart from statutory authority, a judge can only order a
to forget it. Since the work of Justices of the Peace is subject to review by a higher
court, it is not important that their work be scrutinized by the public.
O'Reporting of Committals, The Times, September 25, 1957: Secret Courts
Condemned, The Times, October 24, 1957' p. 7-
6'2he Times, October 25, 1957.
f"he Times, September 24, 1957.
"Denning, The Road to Justice 73 (1955).
0R. v. Gray, io Cox Crim. Cas. 184 (Q.B. 1865).
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trial to be held in camera to prohibit the publication of reports there-
of, when, owing to the special circumstances of the case, justice could
not be done if the trial was a public one. The mere fact that a case
involved the giving of evidence of an indecent nature, as in that nullity
suit, did not justify an order for a private hearing. Lord Loreburn
added:
"Courts of justice in this country must administer justice
in public. To justify an order for a hearing in camera it must
be shown that the paramount object of securing that justice
should be done would be rendered doubtful of attainment if
such order were not made. It cannot be dealt with by the pre-
siding judge as a matter resting in his individual discretion
as to what is expedient." 66
But if the proceedings have been properly heard in camera, and
an order has been made that no report be published, it will be a con-
tempt to disobey this order by reporting the hearing, although its
general conclusion can be announced. 67 The one settled rule of law
in this area would seem to be that in cases involving wards of the
court-infants and persons of unsound mind-the judge has a com-
plete discretion to allow or to forbid publication of the proceedings. 68
On the other hand, Lord Devlin would have defense counsel de-
-Scott v. Scott [1913] 82 L.J.R. 75. A woman bringing a petition for nullity
of marriage because of her husband's impotence, sent copies of the trial transcript
to her relatives to justify herself in their eyes. She was held for contempt by the
Court of Appeals, but the House of Lords reversed.
67n re Martindale [18941 3 Ch. 193, the full report of a private examination
of a witness in a company bankruptcy was held to be a contempt.
Re De Beaujeu's Application for Writ of Attachment Against Cudlipp [1949] 1
All E.R. 439. This is bulwarked by the Children and Young rerson's Act of
1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 5, § 47(2); 3o Halsbury's Laws of England 566 (3d ed.
1959), which allows the courts to exclude the general public from ordinary courts
when a person under 17 is giving evidence in any case involving a charge of
indecency. The general public is not now admitted to juvenile courts but bona
fide representatives of the press may remain on condition that their reports do
not in any way identify those before the court.
The Judicial Proceedings Act of 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 61; 3o Halsbury's
Laws of England 556-57 (3 d ed. 1959), and subsequent legislation, require that
reports of proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage, judicial separation, resti-
tution of conjugal rights or guardianship of infants, whether heard in the divorce
court or a magistrate's court, must contain no more than (a) names, addresses, and
occupations of the parties and witnesses; (b) a concise statement of the charges,
counter-charges and defenses in support of which the evidence is given; (c) sub-
missions and decisions upon points of law; and, (d) the judge's summing up, the
jury's findings, and the judgment and observations made by the judge. No report
of the evidence or of counsel's speeches (except purely legal arguments) can be
given. Anyone violating these laws is subject to a fine of 5oo pounds and four
months imprisonment.
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cide what is too objectionable to the cause of his client to be publish-
able: 69
"In an important case of public interest, the jury is bound to
have some preconceived notions based upon the opening state-
ment made by the prosecution in the preliminary proceedings
and upon the evidence which, in such a case, is normally report-
ed with great particularity. The defendant normally reserving
his defence, inevitably the report becomes one-sided. Is it not
contrary to human nature to expect that each member of the
jury-even after a strong and clear direction-will be able effec-
tively and entirely to divest his mind or hers of every memory of
that opening statement? That the opening statement before the
magistrate should not be reported, seems obviously right."
70
Others have proposed legislation which would close all preliminary
hearings to the public. As it is, some segments of the legal profession 7'
and the press in general are disturbed by the fact that a great many
proceedings in chambers are final in their effect and never result in
a court trial. "Only a fraction of civil proceedings," says The Times,
"now ever sees the light of day, yet, if one constitutional principle
has been firmly established in the past, it is that there should be no
undue secrecy about any judicial proceedings-whether heard in pub-
lic or in private, publication of them may occasionally be delayed but
never entirely suppressed."72 Some lawyers urge that there be no kind
of restraint on giving publicity to proceedings in chambers, or in
camera-following the dicta of the Law Lords in Scott v. Scott.73 But
they would abide by the rule that wards of the court, lunatics and se-
cret processes be excepted. Where interlocutory proceedings are con-
cerned, they would apply the same argument since many of these ac-
tions never come to trial, and possible prejudice of the pending case
can be met by the court.7
4
A THmID LINE OF DEFENSE
Fair trial in England is further bulwarked by the hypersensitivity
of judges to criticism. Although theoretically anyone can criticize a
judge after a case has been concluded and no appeal is pending, pro-
O'Devlin, Trial By Jury (1956).
"Cited in Webber, supra note 54, at 60.
7'JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 18.
7Heard in Camera, The Times, May 15, 1957, p. 11.
-Scott v. Scott, supra note 66.
7'JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 19-2o. This rule is incorporated in the
Administration of Justice Act of ig6o, op. cit supra note 34.
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vided that the criticism is framed in respectful terms and does not
imply that the judge was motivated by partiality or corruption, Eng-
lish editors must fulfill this social obligation with the utmost caution.5
In the Birmingham Spring Assizes of igoo, Justice Darling warned
the press not to give a detailed account of an obscenity trial since
there could be no protection for the publication of objectionable, ob-
scene and indecent matter. The editor of the Daily Argus criticized
the Judge for his "defense of decency." Such publication, said the
court, was scurrilous personal abuse of a judge and a contempt of
court punishable on summary process-even though the attack came
after the termination of the judicial proceeding3 6
In R. v. New Statesman (Editor), Ex parte Director of Public Pros-
ecutions,77 an editor was held liable for publishing criticism of a
judge who presided in a libel case involving an apostle of birth con-
trol. An excerpt from the offending article follows:
"We cannot help regarding the verdict given this week in
the libel action brought by the Editor of the Morning Post
against Dr. Marie Stopes as a substantial miscarriage of justice.
We are not at all in sympathy with Dr. Stopes' work or aims,
but prejudice against those aims ought not to be allowed to in-
fluence a court of justice in the manner in which they appeared
to influence Mr. justice Avory in his summing up.... The ser-
ious point in this case, however, is that an individual owning
"r An exception would appear to be the members of the Privy Council who from
their high places have seemed singularly unimpressed with the rationalizations
of scandalized judges, and have seen fit to reverse judgments brought to them on
appeal from colonial and dominion courts. Supra note 8. In Ambard v. Attorney-
General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] A.C. 322, 335, Lord Atkin made the
the following significant statement:
"But whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the
due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any
member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing, in good
faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path
of criticism is a public way: the wrong headed are permitted to err therein:
provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives
to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely
exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to im-
pair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered
virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though
outspoken, comments of ordinary men."
And in McLeod v. St. Aubyn [1899] A.C. 549, 561, Lord Morris said that "com-
mittals for contempt of Court by scandalizing the Court itself had become obsolete
in this country. Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion attacks or com-
ments derogatory or scandalous to them."
'OR. v. Gray [1goo] 2 Q.B. 36.
7'[1928] 44 TL.R. 301.
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to such views as those of Dr. Stopes cannot apparently hope for
a fair hearing in a Court presided over by Mr. Justice Avory-
and there are so many Avorys."
The attorney-general argued that to say a judge was so steeped in
prejudice and bias that he could not try a case of a certain kind was
worse than to say that on a particular occasion he had deliberately al-
lowed his private views to influence him. Lord Chief Justice Hewart
accepted this argument and only the most effusive apologies by the
editor and his counsel prevented the respondent from paying more
than the costs of the proceeding.
Thomas Colsey, editor of Truth, in commenting upon an earlier
decision of the Court of Appeals relating to proposed institution of
a Trade Board for the catering business, wrote the following sentence:
"Lord Justice Slesser, who can hardly be altogether unbaised about
legislation of this type, maintained that really it was a very nice pro-
visional order or as good a one as can be expected in this vale of tears."
In spite of an expression of deep regret and the acceptance by the
court of a plea of lack of intention, the authority of the judge had
been lowered and the editor paid a fine of ioo pounds and costs.78
In 193o, the Communist Daily Worker criticized Mr. Justice Swift
for the sentence he had imposed upon a Communist Party member
and alleged that he was animated by "strong class bias-the bewigged
puppet and former Tory M. P. chosen to put Communists away in
1926." The comment was held by the court to be a "gross and out-
rageous contempt" and those responsible for the article were sentenced
to terms of from five to nine months imprisonment. 79
The rationale for this seemingly unlimited judicial power has been
stated succinctly by Lord Denning, a jurist known for his liberalism:
"The judges must of course be impartial but it is equally important
that they should be known by all people to be impartial. If they
should be libelled by traducers, so that people lose faith in them,
the whole administration of justice would suffer."80 But the ques-
tion may be asked, where can the criticism of a judge or his ju-
dicial acts begin? And if his competence can be questioned with im-
punity, how can one safely distinguish between innocent imputation
and dangerous allegations of partiality or corruption? As Harold
7'R. v. Colsey, Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions, The Times, May 9,
1931.
,OR. v. Wilkinson and Others, Ex parte The Attorney-General, The Times,
July 16, ig3o.
8Denning, op. cit. supra note 64, at 73.
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Laski observed many years ago: "Every ground which exists for en-
trusting power to a body of men is a ground also for erecting safe-
guards against their abuse of the authority confided to them."8'
Surely judges must be independent and secure, but it can be
argued that they must not be made secure from just criticism. Nor
should a judge be allowed himself to decide what is just and what is
unjust criticism; for there can be little doubt that a great deal of rea-




Ubiquitous to the free press-fair trial issue in England is the law
of contempt. The law is set in motion by out-of-court publications
having a "reasonable tendency" to obstruct or impair the proper
administration of justice, whether before a judge or a jury, or to in-
fluence or prejudice either litigants or witnesses to a cause; by viola-
tion of the rules with respect to pendency, which may begin before
a suspect is arrested and continue until all possibilities of appeal
have been exhausted; by the illegal coverage of preliminary exam-
inations; and by criticism of a judge which may "lower his authority."
English journalists complain that the law is ill-defined so as to be
capricious and arbitrary; the penalties so severe that they are intimidat-
ing, the maximum punishment being life imprisonment, an unlimited
fine or both. The court is at once the aggrieved victim, judge, and
jury. The following editorial comment from The Times may be
typical:
"The pattern of case after case today is as familiar as it is
squalid. The dominating consideration for the defense is to keep
the editor who is alleged to have erred out of prison. With this
nLaski, Procedure for Constructive Contempts in England, 41 Harv. L. Rev.
o31 (1928).
JUSTICE, op. cit supra note 7, at 6: "It appears to us desirable, in considering
whether such an act is contempt, to balance, on the one hand, the effect it might
have on the litigation and, on the other, the interest of the nation in free dis-
cussion." Cf., Steed, The Press 178 (1938): "This method of procedure is calculated
to deter, and does deter, newspapers from offering reasonable criticism upon
so important a matter of public interest as the administration of justice." Inglis,
op. cit. supra note 29: But the major damage which the present contempt does, in
fact, is "in silencing criticism of the Courts and the judiciary, of decisions (where
there appears reason to believe that they have been unfair) and of judges (where
they have been behaving in a manner deserving of criticism)." Fox, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 37: "No Judge has a right by the power of attachment to shut a man's
mouth to prevent his pen from censuring what he thinks erroneous in the dis-
tribution of public justice."
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object the case begins with an abject apology by him. The point
of law is then put rather than pressed-the wrath of the court
must be averted at all costs; a man already grovelling is hardly
in the best position to defend a constitutional principle83
There is no "trial by newspaper" in England. But where the rights
of free press and fair trial come into conflict, the English have failed
to weigh in the balance the interest of the nation in free discussion.
What is instructive in the English experience is the vigor of the
legislature in acting to redress the sometimes delicate balance be-
tween free press and fair trial. Cries for reform were met substantial-
ly in the Administration of Justice Act of 196o,84 which, although re-
flecting government consciousness of the evil of "trial by newspaper,"
still had the effect of "appeasing a majority of the critics," 85 both
lawyer and journalist. Existing laws were changed to permit the press
to plead innocent in cases where it neither knew nor had any reason to
know or suspect that a judicial proceeding had begun; to relieve dis-
tributors of the onerous burden of being liable for the contents of all
their publications; to affirm the right of the press to cover proceedings
in chambers or in camera; and to provide in all contempt cases a
right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, and then, with leave, to the
House of Lords.
In America, the scales are tipping in the other direction and some
would welcome legislative rectification of the resulting wrongs.
"New Muzzle for Free Press, The Times, June 17, 1958, p. 11. (Emphasis added.)
See Hughes, Contempt of Court and the Press, 16 Law Quarterly Review 293 (1900);
Laski, op. cit. supra note 81, and Laski, Legal Restrictions on the British Press,
72 U.S.L. Rev. 568 (1938).
"'Op. cit., supra notes 9, 31, 34, 74-
'Letter from Col. W. C. Clissitt, Secretary of the General Council of the
Press, to the author, London, March 24, 1961-
